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Addressing the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Schools 
A significant body of empirical research shows that compensation, including salary and 
benefits, and working conditions such as neighborhood crime, transportation, job-related danger, 
or cleanliness of the workspace both play important roles in individuals’ labor market decisions. 
This proposition holds true even when taking a more narrowed focus on the teacher labor 
market: compensation and working conditions are important in explaining who opts to pursue a 
career in teaching, where they seek employment, and how long they remain in teaching. 
In the case of teachers, one of the primary working condition concerns appears to be the type 
of students in the classroom. Of course, student characteristics may serve as a proxy for other job 
factors (such as safety, the quality of school leadership, or collegiality among teachers at the 
school) rather than the students themselves, but nonetheless empirical evidence clearly suggests 
that student characteristics are a key predictor of the type of teachers in a school and their 
propensity to remain there (Guarino et al. 2006; Hanushek et al. 2004). Teachers in high-need 
schools, on average, have lower levels of education, have attended lower-quality certifying 
institutions, and perform worse on teacher tests (Lankford et al. 2002). When they have the 
opportunity, high-quality and experienced teachers who work at schools with lower-performing 
students tend to migrate to schools with higher-achieving students and into schools located in 
higher socioeconomic status neighborhoods (Hanushek and Rivkin 2004; Hanushek et al. 1999; 
Lankford et al. 2002).  
There appears to be growing policy interest in using financial incentives to influence the 
distribution of teachers across schools (Goldhaber 2006; Jacobson 2006; Hoff 2005; Prince 
2002) and thus offset the observed pattern of teacher sorting so that more disadvantaged students 
have a better chance of getting a higher-quality teacher.1 States such as Florida and California 
have begun to offer salary bonuses for working in low-income schools, a practice recently 
endorsed by the Massachusetts wing of the American Federation of Teachers (Sacchetti 2006). 
Furthermore, some states such as Maryland and Texas seek to adjust state funding formulas to 
reflect inter-district differences in the difficulty of attracting teachers resulting from working 
conditions that are outside of a locality’s control. For years, state formulas have adjusted the 
funding awarded to individual districts to reflect differential operating costs, such as 
discrepancies in real estate and transportation costs (Colorado Legislative Council Staff 2002; 
Florida Department of Education 2002; Rothstein and Smith 1997; Thompson and Silvernail 
2001; Wyoming Division of Economic Analysis 1999), so this simply represents the next logical 
step in the effort to create an equitable playing field amongst districts. But how much should be 
offered to a teacher (or possibly provided by the state to a local district) to entice her into 
teaching in a disadvantaged school? 
One methodology for calculating compensating salary differentials (combat pay) is to use 
hedonic modeling, a statistical methodology that assigns dollar weights to the factors (both 
teacher-specific and location-specific) that determine individual teachers’ salaries. The theory 
behind the hedonic model is that salaries will reflect not only compensation paid for specific 
human capital characteristics (for example, the specific skills and training an individual brings to 
                                                
1 Under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), policymakers are faced with increasing pressures to staff all 
schools with highly qualified teachers and ensure that all students are making adequate academic progress. 
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the job), but also other job characteristics that influence the attractiveness of working in a 
particular school.2 Unfortunately, using a hedonic technique to estimate the magnitude of the 
differentials necessary to compensate a teacher for a difficult assignment is not a straightforward 
proposition, particularly in the context of public schooling: because teacher salaries are set in the 
public domain, market forces may not guarantee that teachers are paid precisely their ‘value,’ as 
is assumed when utilizing a hedonic approach. 
In the private sector, compensation is thought to adjust smoothly to reflect differences in 
employee skills and working conditions. All else equal, employees with highly sought-after skills 
earn higher wages. Likewise, wages reflect the non-pecuniary aspects of employment, such as 
the location or safety of the job (that is, employees serving in less desirable jobs receive a 
compensation premium—or a compensating differential—over otherwise identical employees 
serving in similar jobs). These adjustments in wages happen through the competitive labor 
market, as employees sort across different types of jobs and employers seek to hire employees 
that best fit their needs at the lowest rate possible. Such wage adjustments may not happen as 
readily in public schools, where salaries are determined in a public sector framework, which 
suggests that the set of competitive pressures that influence compensation in the private sector 
may not exist here. Consequently, the salary differentials that are calculated using this 
methodology in public schools may not accurately reflect what is necessary to compensate 
teachers for differences in job assignments. 
This paper explores the issue of compensating differentials in teaching by estimating hedonic 
models in public and private schools and then comparing these estimates to determine whether 
the setting of teacher salaries in the public sector may bias hedonic estimates of the relationship 
between working condition factors and teacher salaries.3 The paper is structured as follows: first, 
we examine the theory behind hedonics and provide a detailed discussion of why hedonic 
modeling may not work well in public education; then, we present our data and econometric 
models followed by our empirical results; finally, we examine the policy implications of our 
findings and offer some concluding thoughts. 
Hedonics and Why They May Not Work in Public Education 
Hedonic modeling is a statistical methodology that assigns dollar weights to the factors that 
influence prices. In the case of teacher hedonic wage or earnings models, these factors are both 
teacher specific and location/workplace specific. The location/workplace-specific components of 
hedonic models are of key import, as research has long recognized that prices of goods and 
services can vary significantly across geographic areas (Brazer and Anderson 1974; Chambers 
1978). 
The theory behind the hedonic model is that salaries will reflect not only compensation paid 
for specific human capital characteristics (e.g., the specific skills and training an individual 
                                                
2 The theory behind hedonic wage models argues that it will be more expensive to hire personnel into less-
attractive jobs than it would be to hire personnel of comparable quality into jobs that are more attractive. For more 
on the hedonic theory, see Chambers (1981; 1997), Goldhaber (1999), or Hanushek and Rivkin (1999). 
3 We focus on salaries (rather than compensation) because there is little data available on various benefits that 
teachers receive and benefit packages tend not to vary between school systems (so it is not possible to derive good 
estimates of their impacts). 
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brings to the job), but also other characteristics of the job that influence the attractiveness of 
living and working in a particular geographic locale. For instance, it should be more expensive to 
hire personnel into less-desirable jobs than it would be to hire personnel of comparable quality 
into jobs that are more attractive, all else equal. There are, of course, many different factors 
besides salary and benefits that influence the relative attractiveness of a job. For example, 
teachers are likely to favor jobs in areas that have a low cost of living and greater amenities and 
in well-led schools with students who arrive at school ready to learn. 
School districts may have control over certain aspects of what makes a particular teaching 
job attractive: district decisions about class sizes and time for lesson planning, for example, 
influence teachers’ workloads.4 But many of the non-pecuniary characteristics of a job that 
influence its attractiveness—housing costs, crime rates, weather patterns, and demographics of 
the local community, among other things—are outside of a district’s direct control. Prospective 
teachers likely consider all of these factors when making decisions about where to work. 
A hedonic model, if it works, could be used to determine the factors that influence salaries, 
and thus adjust salaries to further a given policy goal, such as an equitable distribution of 
teachers across schools.5 But hedonic modeling may be an ill-suited tool in the context of public 
school teacher labor markets. Boyd et al. (2003) formally describe the arguments for why 
hedonic modeling may fail to accurately estimate the factors that influence teacher salaries. The 
two central issues are the difficulties associated with measuring teacher quality and the 
competitiveness of the teacher labor market.6 
The first major challenge to estimating compensating differentials using hedonic wage 
modeling is that the models must completely account for teacher quality, otherwise the resulting 
wage premiums will mask quality differentials. Education is assumed to be a normal good (a 
product for which we assume that consumption increases with income level) so one would 
expect parents at different income levels to exhibit a different willingness to pay for school and 
teacher quality. As Chambers (1978) has argued, the demand for teacher quality is likely a 
function of parental income and education; parents with higher levels of education are likely to 
place a higher value on education, and affluent parents are likely to be more able, and thus more 
willing, to pay more for higher quality education.  This demand relationship implies that we 
would observe a positive correlation between teacher quality in a school and the income and 
education of the students’ parents.  
                                                
4 And they clearly have control over many of the costs of personnel—choosing, for instance, the seniority of the 
teachers they hire. 
5 It is the factors outside of a district’s control that states may wish to account for when making resource 
allocation decisions, so as to hold districts harmless for decisions they cannot affect and to ensure that all districts 
are on equal footing. 
6 While the non-competitive nature of teacher labor markets may be the primary issue when using a hedonic 
methodology, there are others as well. Boyd et al. (2004), for instance, note that teachers as a group show a strong 
preference for working in or near their hometowns. This may mean that teaching does not have a truly national, or 
even state-wide, labor market, and teachers may face constraints in their job search that are not fully captured by this 
model due to the fact that there is generally little data on the distance between a teacher’s home and prospective 
places of work. While not unique to the teacher labor market, the local nature of the market and the heterogeneity of 
preferences make it challenging to develop a hedonic model that captures all factors of a school’s broader appeal. 
Finally, many teacher labor markets are “thin” in the sense that there are relatively few jobs and candidates. In such 
settings it is more appropriate to use a discrete choice model as opposed to a hedonic approach. 
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Schools with affluent and highly educated parent populations can and do pay teachers more 
than schools with less affluent and or more poorly educated parent populations. In doing so, they 
are thought to be able to attract higher quality teachers.  A model that failed to account fully for 
the difference in teacher quality would lead to the false conclusion that teachers in higher 
income-level schools are paid more because they demand additional compensation to work with 
affluent and/or highly educated populations, preferring to work in schools with lower-income 
and less-educated parents. 
Unfortunately, substantial research has demonstrated that teacher quality is hard to quantify 
with observable teacher characteristics. A significant amount of empirical research shows only 
weak links between readily observable teacher attributes like certification status and degree and 
experience levels, and value-added measures of student achievement (Clotfelter et al. 
forthcoming; Goldhaber and Brewer 1997; Hanushek 1997), but these are the very type of 
variables that are typically available for use when estimating teacher salaries.  Consequently, it 
not clear that these variables adequately account for employee productivity or quality—an 
essential measure to have when using the hedonic method—and observed differentials from 
hedonic models may be confounded by teacher quality differences. 
The second major challenge is that hedonic wage models implicitly assume that wages are 
reasonably flexible so that they equilibrate the supply and demand for various teacher and school 
attributes and this assumption is unlikely to hold, as school districts and schools do not operate 
within a fully competitive labor market.  Many of the conditions that exist in the private sector 
that are thought to lead to full competitive labor markets do not exist in the teacher labor market.  
Schools themselves typically do not compete directly for students so there is not a direct parallel 
to the private sector product market.  The lack of competition means that there is likely less 
pressure to economize on teacher salaries, and may help explain the aforementioned loose 
connection between the attributes that are used to determine teacher compensation and 
productivity. 
Additionally, the funding of schools—both the absolute revenue generated and the allocation 
of resources across agencies or departments—is set in the public sphere and thus subject to 
various political pressures.  Teachers and teachers unions exercise a great deal of political power, 
particularly at the local level where the turnout of the electorate tends to be low (Moe 2005; 
2006).  And, in most districts, salary levels are likely to be explicitly influenced by either state 
policy or contracts negotiated at the local level. At the very least, the common use of district-
wide pay scales—commonly referred to as the single salary schedule—implies that districts do 
not adjust salaries in schools within the district.7 
If teacher salaries are in fact ‘sticky’ in the sense that they don’t rapidly adjust to reflect 
preferences, then a key assumption of the hedonic model is violated and the distribution of 
teachers across schools does not convey the same information that it would in the context of a 
fully competitive labor market. In effect, there is likely to be an asymmetry in the information 
that we observe. If a salary offer for a particular teaching position does not meet the reservation 
wage of a teacher with a particular set of credentials, information is provided in that we will not 
see that teacher in that teaching position, and from this we can infer that a particular salary is not 
high enough to attract that teacher. If, on the other hand, a salary offer for a teaching position 
                                                
7 Individual schools may, however, adjust in other ways, such as granting highly valued teachers a more 
favorable classroom (Player 2007). 
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exceeds what is required to induce a teacher with a particular set of credentials to accept a 
position then we will observe that teacher in the position, so we know the salary is high enough 
to attract that teacher, but we do not observe the excess that a district is paying that teacher. 
Under a hedonic model it is assumed that there is no excess payment, so any excess leads to 
bias in the estimates of the factors influencing a teacher’s earnings. For example, if wealthier 
districts with low free/reduced-price lunch (FRL) student populations tend to pay teachers in 
excess of what is required to induce them to accept positions in schools, then the estimate of the 
amount that is required to pay teachers to teach in schools with few students on FRL would be 
biased upward, and conversely, the model would understate how much is required to induce 
teachers to teach in schools with large disadvantaged student populations. 
Boyd et al. (2003) show that the empirical estimates of compensating differentials for 
particular schooling attributes derived from a hedonic model can be quite different from those 
derived using a fundamentally different statistical approach. Unfortunately, the statistical 
methodology employed by Boyd et al. is quite novel (as far as we are aware it has not been used 
before in the context of estimating compensating differentials in teaching), complex and 
extremely computer resource intensive.8 Thus, at least for the time being, it is unlikely to be a 
practical approach for most states and localities.  
We have good reasons to believe that an analysis of private schools can help shed light on 
whether, and the extent to which, hedonic models provide misleading information in a public 
school setting. Specifically, private school salaries are not determined in the public domain, and 
thus, are much more likely to be competitively determined. As such, the market conditions are 
more in line with the underlying assumptions of the hedonic model.9 Adequate assessment of 
teacher quality remains a challenge in the private sector. For that reason, a hedonic model for 
private school teachers may continue to suffer from the omission of important variables.  
Nonetheless, research on teacher pay in private school settings (Ballou and Podgursky 1998; 
Goldhaber and Liu 2003) suggests that private schools are more likely than public schools to 
recognize and reward differences in teacher characteristics in a way that is consistent with the 
reward structure in the labor market as a whole.10 For that reason, a model based on the private 
sector, while far from perfect, is preferable to one based on public school teachers alone.  The 
following section describes the data and methodology we employ in comparing hedonic 
estimates in public and private school settings.  
Data and Methodology 
The data come from two sources: the 1999–2000 School and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the 
2000 Census. The SASS is a National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) survey of both 
                                                
8 Their alternative is “based on a game-theoretic two-sided matching model and the estimation strategy employs 
the method of simulated moments” (1). 
9 Furthermore, focusing on private school teachers may also, at least to some degree, address the locational-pull 
concern raised by Boyd et al. (2003). In particular, one would think that private school teachers would be less likely 
than public school teachers to seek out employment near home since public sector state licensing requirements are 
responsible for at least some of the locational pull observed in public schools, whereas private schools have far 
looser credentialing requirements. 
10 For example, private schools are more likely to pay a premium for teachers that have expertise in high-
demand subjects. 
Working Paper 17  Goldhaber et al.  
 8 
public and private schools that collects information about teacher compensation, school 
demographics, and working conditions from teachers, principals, and district personnel. Using 
the 1997–1998 Common Core of Data (CCD) school file as a sampling frame, NCES 
oversampled private schools to generate statistically significant findings. The survey contains 
responses from 56,354 teachers in 5,465 public schools and 10,760 teachers in 3,558 private 
schools. Census data was used to capture community-level characteristics—labor market 
conditions, demographics, and cost of living. We focused on a teacher’s base salary as a 
dependent variable —the salary earned during the school year for academic teaching 
responsibilities alone (excluding stipends for coaching and summer teaching as well as any 
bonuses or monetary awards).11 
One of the variables we concentrate on is free/reduced-price lunch (FRL) since there is 
significant policy interest in combat pay—compensating teachers for the difficulty of job 
assignment—and FRL is often used as a proxy measure for this difficulty. The National School 
Lunch Program (NSLP) allows participation in the program from any public (including charter 
schools) or nonprofit private school.12 To participate, schools must agree to four conditions: 
operating service for all students regardless of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability; 
providing free/reduced-price lunches to students who meet certain income eligibility criteria; 
serving lunches that meet nutritional standards set out by the Secretary of Agriculture; and 
operating the food service on a nonprofit basis (United States Department of Agriculture Food 
and Nutrition Service). 
While the above conditions certainly don’t preclude private school participation, measures of 
students on FRL may be a poorer indicator of the income level of the student bodies of private 
than public schools in practice. Many private schools may lack the organizational capacity to 
administer the program, a function that is typically carried out by school districts in the public 
sector. Indeed, research shows that levels of private school NSLP participation are far lower than 
public school participation (Peterson and Llaudet 2007). Low recording rates may also reflect the 
relative affluence of private school students compared to public school populations—even 
schools that report lunch information report much lower percentages of qualified students. If 
only a small number of students qualify for lunch services, schools may not find recording to be 
worth the effort. A 1998 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimated that while 97 
percent of public schools participate in the FRL program, only 45 percent of private schools do 
so—a finding that is reflected in our data as well.13 Approximately 24 percent of the private 
schools in the survey failed to record FRL information, compared to 1.6 percent of public 
                                                
11 It is worth noting that teachers are typically hired on a 10-month contract so the salaries reported here are not 
directly comparable to salaries in the labor market as a whole. For more on this issue, see Allegretto et al. (2004), 
Vedder (2004), or Podgursky (2006). 
12 The vast majority of private K–12 schools in the United States are not-for-profit, though a precise percentage 
has been hard to track down. SASS does not ask schools their for-profit status; however, the related NCES Private 
School Universe survey found that only 244 of almost 30,000 private schools belonged to the National Independent 
Private Schools Association, the membership and accrediting body for for-profit private schools. 
13 Underreporting may also result from the fact that students must submit written documentation of their 
household income in order to participate in the program. For the 2007–2008 school year, eligibility cut-offs for a 
family of four will be $38,203 for reduced-price lunch and $26,845 for free lunch. 
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schools. However, we found few systematic differences in our variables of interest between 
private schools that did and did not record FRL information.14 
In table 1 we report selected school and teacher characteristics by school sector, broken out 
by the percentage of FRL-eligible students (at the school level).15 Not surprisingly, the student 
populations in each sector appear to be quite different on other dimensions as well, for example, 
a far smaller share of students in private schools is minority, is classified as limited English 
proficient (LEP), and has an individualized education plan (IEP) identifying a special education 
status. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics by School Sector and Free Lunch Quartile 
                                                
14 The difference in means in minority enrollment (z=.385) and in the percentage of LEP students (z=.14) was 
not statistically significant at the .05 level. The difference in means in the percentage of IEP students was 
statistically significant at the .05 level, but not at the .01 level (z=2.14); and the difference in means for salary and 
total enrollment, while statistically significant, was nonetheless small. Schools that did not report FRL statistics had 
98 percent of the enrollment of reporting schools. Teachers at these schools had 90 percent of the experience, but 
earned, on average, salaries that were 3.6 percent higher than teachers at reporting schools. 
15 The limited range of free/reduced-price lunch eligibility within the private school sector makes breaking out 
characteristics by private school quartile unfeasible. For that reason, private school characteristics are separated 
according to eligibility ranges found in the pubic school sector. Despite the small sample size in some subgroups, 
salaries have been found to be statistically distinct. 
 Public Schools Private Schools 
 Overall Quart 1 Quart 2 Quart 3 Quart 4 Overall Public Quart 1 
Public 
Quart 2 
Public  
Quart 3 
Public 
Quart 4 
% FRL Students  0.37 <0.15 0.15-0.32 
0.32-
0.54 >0.54 0.04 <0.15 
0.15-
0.32 
0.32-
0.54 >0.54 
Observations 38,371 9,686 9,673 9,698 9,674 6,371 6,205 95 18 53 
Teacher Qualities 
Base Teaching 
Salary $36,384 $39,790 $35,450 $34,917  $35,377 $25,619 $25,601 $22,838 $26,049 $32,546  
Teaching Experience 
(in years) 14.73 15.32 15.15 14.63 13.84 12.32 12.34 12.76 10.33 10.40 
Higher Degree 0.44 0.51 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.53 
Fully Certified 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.46 0.46 0.56 0.50 0.58 
Gender (Male) 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.26 
School Characteristics 
School Week (in 
hours) 36.96 36.66 36.95 37.05 37.19 35.14 35.12 34.98 38.22 37.47 
% Planning Time 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Class Size (in tens of 
students) 2.15 2.29 2.20 2.10 2.00 1.91 1.91 2.03 1.60 1.62 
Interruptions (in past 
week) 10.33 8.91 9.96 10.29 12.17 7.86 7.75 10.22 17.83 13.04 
Threat (never, ever, 
in past year) 0.31 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.41 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.44 0.70 
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Table 1 (cont’d). Summary Statistics by School Sector and Free Lunch Quartile 
Teachers in private schools are far less likely than those in public schools to report that they 
have been threatened in the past year or that student disruptions are a significant problem at their 
school, but teacher reports from both sectors show these events become more likely as the 
proportion of FRL students in schools increases, thus providing support for the notion that the 
difficulty of working conditions increases with the relative disadvantage of the student 
populations. Public schools pay significantly higher salaries than private schools, but base 
salaries in public schools are not found to be higher in the more disadvantaged schools. In 
contrast, the more-disadvantaged private schools do pay significantly higher salaries than the 
less-disadvantaged ones. Thus, the descriptive statistics suggest that private schools are more 
likely than public schools to pay higher salaries to compensate teachers for the difficulty of their 
working conditions. However, it is entirely possible that these findings simply reflect the fact 
that schools compensate teachers in other ways, such as providing smaller classes. As table 1 
indicates, class sizes are significantly smaller in both sectors for teachers in more-disadvantaged 
schools. 
To explore these issues in greater depth, we estimate hedonic models of the following form: 
! 
log(salary) ="0 +"1T +"2S +"3C + #  
where T is a vector of teacher characteristics; S is a vector of school conditions; and C is a vector 
to measure the economic state of the surrounding community. We estimate log-linear 
specifications of this model consistent with much of the literature on human capital (Mincer 
1974; Heckman et al. 1996). This specification implies that the coefficients estimated from our 
models should be interpreted as describing the percentage change in salaries resulting from a 
one-unit change in an independent variable, holding all other variables in our model constant. 
The included explanatory variables are similar to the set of personnel variables used in past 
research on the determinants of teacher salaries (Chambers and Fowler 1995; Goldhaber 1999). 
The vector of teacher characteristics variables is intended to capture qualities that influence 
 Public Schools Private Schools 
 Overall Quart 1 Quart 2 Quart 3 Quart 4 Overall Public Quart 1 
Public 
Quart 2 
Public  
Quart 3 
Public 
Quart 4 
Student Demographics 
% FRL Students 0.37 0.07 0.23 0.43 0.77 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.42 0.89 
% IEP 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.23 0.51 
% LEP 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
% Minority 
Enrollment 0.30 0.14 0.19 0.29 0.60 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.48 
Admissions 
Requirements 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.76 0.77 0.53 0.39 0.66 
Highest Tuition N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $5,779 $5,788 $3,683  $11,817  $6,412  
Religious N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.81 0.81 0.93 0.78 0.45 
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compensation—degree and experience levels—as well as those that may make a teacher more or 
less desirable to a particular school district (complete descriptions of the set of variables used in 
this study are reported in appendix A). For example, some districts may have preferences for 
teachers of a particular race or ethnicity because they are attempting to provide educational role 
models for students (Dee 2004; Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994). 
Of particular interest are the school- and community-level characteristics that may make a 
school more or less desirable to a prospective employee. As described in the preceding section, 
empirical research has shown that non-pecuniary characteristics play an important role in 
influencing teacher mobility. We focus on two general measures of working conditions: teacher 
workload and student characteristics. Three variables measure work demands: school week 
length, average class size, and the percentage of time teachers are explicitly granted for lesson 
planning. One would expect the work week length and class size to have a positive correlation 
with salary; schools that require teachers to work longer hours would, all else equal, need to pay 
higher salaries. Conversely, the more time during the day that teachers can devote to lesson 
planning and/or the smaller their assigned class, the lighter their workload, implying lower 
salaries. 
Student characteristics and school environment are, of course, major components of working 
conditions. Past research has shown teachers’ preference for affluent and high-performing 
students (or the characteristics of schools that tend to educate such students). To capture these, 
we include seven measures of student characteristics and school environment. Three of these—
the percentage of LEP students; the percentage of IEP students; and the percentage of FRL 
students—are student demographic characteristics. The remaining four—the level of student 
tardiness; student disruption and threatening behavior; and whether the school sets criteria for 
admission—are measures designed to capture the environments of the schools in our sample. 
Both Hanushek et al. (2004) and Scafidi et al. (2005) have argued that race plays a large role in 
teacher mobility (moving both within and between districts and out of the profession) so we also 
experiment with model specifications that include the percentage of non-white students within a 
particular school and/or the percentage of minorities in the community at large. Finally, 
community variables provide information about both a locale’s desirability and the broader labor 
market conditions that may have an impact on salary. Thus, in some specifications, we include a 
measure of cost-of-living in the local area (housing prices), the education level of the local 
community, and measures of a district’s fiscal capacity or, in the case of private schools, the 
level of tuition that is charged.  
Results 
Table 2 presents selected coefficient results from our basic hedonic models. We estimate 
these models separately for public and private schools based on our theory that schools in the 
two sectors may differentially reward individual characteristics as well as compensating 
differentials. A Chow tests rejects the hypothesis (p<.0001) that the coefficients predicting 
salaries in the public and private sectors are the same, indicating that it is appropriate to model 
the two sectors separately.16 Furthermore, as shown in panel A of table 3, F-tests indicate that 
                                                
16 A model that pools public and private schools and includes a dichotomous variable identifying if a school is 
private shows teachers in private schools earn about 40 percent less than teachers in public schools. 
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each of the three subsets of variables—teacher characteristics, school characteristics, and 
community characteristics (defined in the table)—add significant explanatory power to our 
model in both the public and private school sectors. 
 
Table 2. Regression Results by School Type  
 Public Schools Private Schools 
(Intercept) 9.29* (0.02) 
7.98* 
(0.09) 
Teacher Characteristics 
Teaching Experience (in years) 0.02* (0.0007) 
0.03* 
(0.003) 
Experience squared -0.0004* (2.0E-5) 
-0.005* 
(8.2E-5) 
Higher Degree 0.13* (0.004) 
0.10* 
(0.02) 
High-Demand Subject 0.001 (0.004) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Race/Ethnicity -0.003 (0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
Gender (Male) 0.021* (0.004) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Fully Certified 0.02* (0.01) 
0.09* 
(0.02) 
School Characteristics 
Enrollment (in hundreds) 0.002* (0.0003) 
0.02* 
(0.004) 
School Week (in hours) 0.01* (0.0003) 
0.03* 
(0.001) 
% Planning Time 0.18* (0.03) 
0.46* 
(0.13) 
Class Size (in tens of students) 0.002 (0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.001) 
% LEP 0.09* (0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.24) 
% IEP 0.07* (0.02) 
0.36* 
(0.06) 
% Minority Enrollment 0.07* (0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
% Free/Reduced-Price Lunch 
Students 
-0.06* 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
Admission Requirements -0.01* (0.005) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
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Table 2 (cont’d). Regression Results by School Type  
 Public Schools Private Schools 
Community Characteristics 
City -0.02* (0.006) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
Rural -0.07* (0.005) 
-0.17* 
(0.03) 
% College Graduates -0.28 * (0.03) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
Average Rent (in thousands of 
dollars) 
0.01 * 
(0.0008) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Median Home Value (in hundreds 
of thousands of dollars) 
0.05* 
(0.003) 
0.05* 
(0.01) 
Unemployment Rate 1.15* (0.06) 
0.81* 
(0.35) 
Median Earnings (in tens of 
thousands of dollars) 
0.14* 
(0.004) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
R2 0.34 0.23 
   Note: *=significant at the .05 level 
Cursory examination of table 2 suggests similar returns between sectors in some of the key 
characteristics that influence salaries. For example, consistent with theory and prior empirical 
research (Chambers and Fowler 1995), both public and private schools compensate more-
experienced teachers and those who have obtained higher degrees. Private and public schools are 
also alike in the positive correlation between length of the school week and the salary earned. 
But, there are notable differences as well. Private schools offer a smaller premium to teachers 
who have earned advanced degrees and a higher premium for teachers that are fully certified, 
that teach high-demand subjects, or who are male. Attention to high-demand fields and a 
teacher’s gender may reflect private schools’ greater responsiveness to market factors when 
determining salaries. Similarly, full certification may serve as a proxy for teacher preparation in 
the private school sector, where such certification is not a blanket requirement for hiring. 
Both public and private schools appear to offer some compensating differentials. As theory 
would indicate, the point estimates suggest that teachers are paid more for working longer hours 
in a week or teaching larger classes. But, the returns to several of the school and community-
level variables are inconsistent with theory (e.g., planning time and unemployment rate17) and 
also differ by sector. For example, we find the signs of the coefficients are different for the 
percentage of limited-English proficient students in a school, the percentage of minority students, 
whether a school has admissions requirements, the percentage of FRL-eligible students, and the 
percentage of college graduates. 
                                                
17 Planning time and salary may be positively correlated because each serves as a proxy for a school’s 
unmeasured financial resources. In other words, better-funded schools not only can pay teachers higher salaries; they 
can also hire more teachers, thus freeing up the school schedule to allot more planning time. Similarly, a 
community’s unemployment rate reflects its overall affluence and student composition rather than simply the 
tightness of the labor market. Teachers’ preference for working with more advantaged students may make them 
willing to work for lower salaries. 
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We formally test whether differences between sectors are significant for subsets of variables 
(individual, school, and community), estimating models that pool public and private schools and 
include interaction terms between variables in the subset and private school sector, and then 
testing the joint significance of these interaction terms. For example, we calculate the F-statistic 
for joint test of significance of the interactions between private school sector and individual 
teacher variables. These tests (reported in panel B of table 3) do suggest significant differences 
between public and private schools in the returns to these groups of individual, school, and 
community variables (α =0.001).  
Table 3. Comparison of Models 
Panel A 
Test of Addition of Variable Subsets 
 F-value: Public 
School Models 
F-value: Private 
School Models 
Base model (Teacher 
Characteristics18 alone) - - 
Addition of School Characteristics 19 106.84 340.11 
Addition of Community 
Characteristics20 24.01 445.61 
Panel B 
Test of Difference Between Public and Private Schools 
 (Interaction Between Variable Subsets and Private School Dummy) 
Teacher Characteristics 20.66 
School Characteristics 152.68 
Community Characteristics 24.06 
Student Poverty and Race: Tests of Robustness 
As we described above, a primary motivation for estimating a hedonic teacher salary is to 
make inferences about teacher preferences for teaching in disadvantaged schools. These could 
then be used to derive estimates of the compensating differentials, or combat pay, required to 
encourage teachers to take positions in these schools. Our model (see table 2) suggests that 
private schools offer more of what policymakers think about as combat pay in the sense that 
those schools with higher percentages of FRL-eligible students pay higher salaries. The 
coefficient on the FRL variable in private schools, which is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, suggests that for every 10 percent increase in the percentage of FRL-eligible 
students, teachers receive 2 percent in additional pay. By contrast, the point estimate of the 
public school variable, which is statistically distinct (based on the interaction term for school 
                                                
18 Includes teaching experience, higher degree, high-demand subject, race/ethnicity, gender, and fully certified. 
19 Includes enrollment, school week, planning time, class size, % LEP, % IEP, minority enrollment, % 
free/reduced-price lunch students, and admissions criteria 
20 Includes city, rural, college graduates, average rent, median home value, unemployment rate, and median 
earnings.  
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sector and FRL in a model that pools public and private schools), suggests that teachers are 
willing to work for lower salaries in disadvantaged schools. This, of course, is both 
counterintuitive and counter to estimates of the value that teachers place on working conditions 
derived from analyses of teacher mobility (Hanushek et al. 2004). 
Many students in poverty are also students of color (the correlation of the two variables in 
our sample is .31). Furthermore, there is some evidence that teachers may be as much or more 
influenced by student race/ethnicity as they are by student poverty (Scafidi et al. 2005). We 
explore this issue further by experimenting with specifications that exclude the minority 
population variable. As we show in table 4, the exclusion of the racial composition of students 
does not substantively change the observed effect of poverty, or the estimated effects of other 
student characteristics, on teacher salaries for either public schools (compare columns 1 and 2) or 
for private schools (compare columns 4 and 5). 
Finally, we explore whether teacher salaries are related to direct measures of working 
conditions.21 Prior research suggests that in-school factors such as safety and orderliness are 
significant factors in teachers’ attrition from hard-to-staff schools. (Ingersoll 2004) Teachers in 
the survey are asked whether tardiness or interruptions are a problem and whether they have 
been threatened. The addition of these variables to our public (column 3) and private (column 6) 
models did not change the findings on the other student variables; none of these additional 
variables were statistically significant and there were no statistically significant differences 
between sectors in the coefficient estimates of these variables.22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 While not reported, we also estimated private school models that include the highest tuition charged and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the school had a religious orientation. Religious orientation, as we expected, had 
a negative correlation with teacher salaries; teachers who work at religious schools may be willing to forgo higher 
salaries out of a sense of larger mission or a desire to work in a community with like-minded values. Given teachers’ 
preference for working with affluent students, we thought that higher tuition would also correspond to lower 
salaries. In fact, a higher tuition is correlated with higher salaries. Because a school’s tuition may correspond to its 
fiscal capacity, schools with higher tuitions may be able to pay teachers more, or it may be that more-affluent 
families paying higher tuition also demand that schools pay teachers more. 
22 It is worth noting, however, that these variables may be endogenous in the sense that teachers receiving 
higher or lower salaries may be more or less likely to report problems in school. 
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Table 4. Tests of Robustness 
 Public Schools Private Schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Base 
Model 
Model 
without 
Minority 
enrollment 
Model with 
Teacher 
Reports 
Base 
Model 
Model 
without 
Minority 
enrollment 
Model with 
Teacher 
Reports 
% Free/ 
Reduced Price 
Lunch Students 
-0.06 
(.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
% IEP  0.07 (0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.36 
(0.06) 
0.36 
(0.06) 
0.33 
(0.07) 
% LEP  0.09 (0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.24) 
-0.04 
(0.24) 
-0.02 
(0.24) 
% Minority 
Enrollment 
0.07 
(0.01) - 
0.06 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.05) - 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
% Tardy - - 0.02 (0.01) - - 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Interruptions 
(in past week)  - - 
0.0003 
(0.0001) - - 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
Threat (never, 
ever, in past 
year) 
- - 0.01 (0.003) - - 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Both the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and recent research highlight the importance of 
teacher quality and the teacher qualification gap that exists between rich and poor public schools. 
Some have suggested that this gap results from the salary structure used in the overwhelming 
majority of school districts. Specifically, within districts, schools with less-desirable working 
conditions have no means to adjust their compensation, and, as a result, the most qualified 
teachers choose the more-affluent schools (Hanushek et al. 2004; Hanushek and Rivkin 2004; 
Hill 2006; Hill et al. 1997; Lankford et al. 2002). While states and localities may wish to change 
this structure and offer teachers greater compensation to teach in disadvantaged schools, it is an 
open question as to the magnitude of the pay differences that will entice teachers to take more-
difficult positions. 
Our comparison of the estimated returns to individual, school, and community characteristics 
in public and private schools suggests that the economic returns to these variables differ between 
school sectors. Consider a female teacher of median education and experience choosing between 
two schools that were identical in everything except the wealth of its student body.  One has an 
affluent student population (in the 25th percentile of free-lunch students; the other has a large 
proportion of students in poverty (the 75th percentile of free-lunch students).  Working in the 
private school sector, our estimates predict she could expect to earn a compensating differential 
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of  $1,798 for taking on the challenge of more-disadvantaged students.  In the average public 
school, however, such a compensating differential disappears.  In fact, the model suggests she 
would earn $620 less for teaching in the school with poorer students. 23 
There is, of course, more than one explanation for why the returns might vary. Private 
schools are certainly not a perfect comparison group for public schools and it is possible that we 
have not adequately accounted for the working conditions or teacher quality in either sector. It is 
also possible that private school teachers have preferences that are quite distinct from public 
school teachers. We argue that a more plausible explanation for the observed differences is that 
private schools’ teacher salaries are determined in a more competitive labor market than in 
public schools. Unfortunately, this suggests that one of the approaches to deriving such 
estimates—hedonic teacher salary models—does not work well for public school labor markets. 
So where does this leave policymakers wishing to get reasonable estimates of the ‘right’ 
salary differential? There are at least four options. The first is to more thoroughly pursue the 
strategy that we have employed here, and use estimates of compensating differentials from 
private schools as a measure of the pay differentials that might be used in the public sector. In 
practice, however, this would likely require new datasets, as the Schools and Staffing Survey has 
a relatively small sample of private schools in many states.  
Second, more efforts could be put into estimating salary differentials using teacher mobility 
as in Hanushek et al. (2004). The difficulty here is that, if school systems continue to employ the 
single salary schedule, then estimated compensating differentials would be based solely on 
teachers that move from one district to another since there would be no within-district salary 
differentials. 
A third possibility is to explore alternative estimation techniques, such as the one employed 
by Boyd et al. (2003). Their approach is novel, and very data- and computer-intensive, but will 
likely become better understood and more feasible in the future as more teacher and school data 
is collected and statisticians have a chance to better evaluate the methodology.  
Finally, the option likely to generate the best estimates of the value teachers place on various 
schooling attributes is to evaluate the direct effects of departing from a strict adherence to the 
single salary schedule—this would require varying salaries between schools to observe how this 
affects the teacher labor market. 
                                                
23 Results are similar regardless of a teacher’s race or gender, and remain robust when we incorporate 
corresponding changes in minority enrollment into the model.  Comparing schools that differ not only in affluence 
but also in corresponding student characteristics (minority status, English proficiency, need for an IEP) results in an 
even more dramatic “compensating differential” gap.  A teacher working at a public school with these qualities 
would earn a $1,193 premium, while a private school teacher would earn a premium of $6,165. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
TEACHER VARIABLES DATA SOURCE VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Teaching Experience SASS Teacher Survey Self-reported years of teaching experience.  
Higher Degree SASS Teacher Survey Teacher’s highest degree is Master’s degree, Ph.D. or other advanced degree. 
High-Demand Subject SASS Teacher Survey Teacher’s primary subject is math, science or special education. 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Black), (Hispanic), (Asian) SASS Teacher Survey Self-reported race/ethnicity.  
Gender 
(Male) SASS Teacher Survey Self-reported gender. 
Fully Certified SASS Teacher Survey 
Teacher has completed all state certification 
requirements and obtained either probationary or 
full certification status. 
SCHOOL VARIABLES DATA SOURCE VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Total Enrollment (in 
hundreds) SASS School Survey Number of students enrolled at school. 
School Week SASS Teacher Survey Total number of contract hours in school week. 
Planning Time SASS Teacher Survey The proportion of scheduled time set aside for planning. 
Class Size 
(in tens of students) SASS Teacher Survey 
Average class size of departmental and self-
contained classes. 
% LEP SASS Teacher Survey The proportion of students in the school who are limited-English proficient. 
% IEP SASS Teacher Survey The proportion of students in the school that is on an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). 
% Minority Enrollment SASS Teacher Survey The proportion of minority students in the school. 
% Free/Reduced-Price 
Lunch Students SASS School Survey 
The proportion of students in the school who are 
eligible for free lunch programs under the National 
School Lunch Act.  
Admissions Requirements SASS School Survey School has admissions requirements other than age, immunization and proof of residence. 
% Tardy SASS Teacher Survey Teacher-reported proportion of students who arrive tardy to class. 
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Appendix A (cont’d): Variable Definitions  
 
SCHOOL VARIABLES  DATA SOURCE VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Interruptions (in past week) SASS Teacher Survey 
Teacher report of how many times he/she had to 
interrupt class because of student misbehavior in 
past week. 
Threat (never, ever, in the 
past year) SASS Teacher Survey 
Teacher report of whether he/she has been 
threatened by a student. 
Religious SASS School Survey School has a religious orientation. 
Highest Tuition SASS School Survey Highest tuition charged by the school. 
COMMUNITY 
VARIABLES DATA SOURCE VARIABLE DEFINITION 
City SASS School Survey School is located in an urban area. 
Rural SASS School Survey School is located in a rural area. 
% College Graduates 2000 Census Data Proportion of residents with a Bachelor’s degree or higher degree in community. 
Average Rent (in thousands 
of dollars) 2000 Census Data 
Average rent of all rental housing units in 
community. 
Median Home Value (in 
hundreds of thousands of 
dollars) 
2000 Census Data Median value of all housing units in community.  
Unemployment Rate 2000 Census Data Proportion of residents who are unemployed. 
Median Earnings (in tens of 
thousands of dollars) 2000 Census Data 
Median income for all adult residents in the 
community. 
 
  
 
 
 
